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“We can only interpret by our experiences” –  
Nature/culture in Forster’s ‘Cambridge’ Novels 
 
This essay offers a reading of E. M. Forster’s two ‘Cambridge Novels’, The Longest Journey 
(1907), and Maurice (1971), that recasts Forster’s engagement with nature as one more 
directly interpretable through a phenomenological lens. The reception of these two novels 
often focuses on the redemptive quality of Cambridge as a ‘heaven for young men’, a notion 
based on Forster’s personal history. This underrepresents the evidence of Forster’s ethics of 
attending to nature. This essay, therefore, offers a fresh analysis of the fate of the main 
characters in the two novels. It considers the shifting values of the environment in the 
narratives at the beginning of the twentieth century, and their ramifications for Forster’s 
moral concern with lived experience and immanence connected to the natural environment. 
The resulting evaluation posits that entanglement with nature results in the complete 
subversion of human character into natureculture. 
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 “We can only interpret by our experiences” –  
Nature/culture in Forster’s ‘Cambridge’ Novels 
 
E. M. Forster’s The Longest Journey, published in 1907, and Maurice, published 
posthumously in 1971, his favourite novel and his most exigent one, are loosely connected 
through the Bildungsroman genre (Booth 2007, 173), which points to a preoccupation with 
culture and social transformation. The ‘Cambridge novel’, labelled as such by Mortimer 
Proctor (1957), refers here to the fictional representation of Forster’s alma mater, King’s 
College Cambridge, which features prominently in both novels as a genius locus. George 
Steiner allows, for example, in Maurice that “the university chapters are the heart of the 
book” (1973, 476).  
The importance of the natural environment as immanent in the phenomenology of 
every-day life, rather than as a ready-made external world, however, deserves more 
exploration in these novels. Immanence is here understood as indeterminate material 
vitality of the environment, neither preformed nor spatialised. As Diana Coole proposes, 
the conventional sense of the environment as merely reactive to human agency is 
uprooted by the “immanent generativity of existence”, which is self-transformative 
through eternal shifts, loops and slippages (2010, 106). Merleau-Ponty considered 
immanence “being prior to reflection” (1968, 65), which can be understood as the 
undetermined flux of lived experience. It is an embodied awareness that rejects the 
obvious subject – object positions of cultural imprinting onto nature. It, instead, 
problematises the relationship to one of multiple dynamic interactions, which leads to a 
different type of bildung, a becoming, or, as Neil Evernden (1996) suggests, a knowing 
rooted in the experience of place. 
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The novels are, however, mainly studied as autobiographical pointers to Forster’s 
own unhappy childhood and perceived redemption at university. It has become 
somewhat of a doctrine in Forsterian scholarship that Cambridge symbolises the ‘good 
life’ (Colmer 1975, 6), a place of light and liberation that compares with ancient Athens 
(Macaulay 1938). This paper, however, takes issue with the idea that the university 
alone is responsible for instilling an ethical response to the world, and instead proposes 
that being-in-the-world is already an ethical performance through its living participation 
wedded to an authentic existence. Specifically, a sense of ‘being-in’ rather than ‘being-
of’ the world, in the sense of a more-than proximal relationship, saves Forster’s 
protagonist entangled with the environment and is disastrous for him who fails to 
achieve such oneness, who regards the natural as the ‘other’ that must be suppressed. 
This inquiry, therefore, links Forster’s interest in the wholeness of human experience – 
illustrated famously in his advice to ‘Only Connect’ – to a perspective that ponders the 
interplay between the human and the nonhuman material world in The Longest Journey 
and Maurice. As Kelly Sultzbach notes, the desire to ‘only connect’ extends not only to 
humans, but also to the environment (2016, 28). 
Entanglement is understood not simply as introspection, where the body acts as the 
dividing line between interior (mind) and exterior (nature), but as an agentive, ongoing 
and iterative reconfiguration of the world (Barad 2007, 160, 181). The degradation of 
Clive Durham and Rickie Elliot, characters who fail to commit to such agentive 
entanglements, is to flunk effervescent performance of the world for a ‘tragic and 
enduring’ quality of life, as Forster termed it in Aspects of the Novel (1974, 90). They 
represent the ontological gap between appearance and experience, as they erase nature 
from their being in a crisis. Rickie, for example, senses that nature represents a 
password to life, but that “the heart of all the things was hidden” to him (Forster 2006, 
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144). Clive Durham, similarly, is “unable to distinguish matter from spirit” and faints 
(Forster 1977, 107). 
In contrast, the ‘emotional thrill’ of lived experience in nature, as described in the 
preface to The Longest Journey (2006, xxii), provides the motivation for a critical 
understanding of Forster’s rendering of a ‘good life’, or eudaimonia, where the 
flourishing of life occurs as an entanglement of ‘natureculture’, rather than as 
philosophy studied at Cambridge. Natureculture, a symbiotic concept of entanglement 
(Haraway 2003, 17), speaks to the non-discreteness of ecologies that are both materially 
and socially formed. As Barad notes, “We don’t obtain knowledge by standing outside 
the world” (2007, 185). Forster’s material philosophy of lived experience in the two 
novels questions the moral philosophy entrenched in a liberal education that encourages 
introspection and provides an alternative reading of ethical relationships with the world.  
Previous commentaries on Forster’s Cambridge novels, nevertheless, focused on 
the benefits of liberal education in view of Matthew Arnold’s exalting notion of 
Hellenism as an expediter of integrative experience (Jacobowitz 2004). Forster, who 
‘knew his Arnold’ (Kermode 2009, 133), certainly appreciated a humanistic 
conceptualisation of education. The university, as a “popularised form of liberal 
education”, inhabits the role of ‘master educator’ in the Arnoldian sense (Bogen 2006, 
17). Simply breathing the university atmosphere educates (Proctor 1957, 154). These 
“emanations of the Oxford spirit” (Proctor 1957, 157) may also be applied to 
Cambridge, even though, Bogen argues, the so-called “puritanical ethos” of this 
university worked to a degree against the liberalising atmosphere of Oxford with its 
champions, Matthew Arnold and Cardinal Newman (2006, 15).  
Formal education was also formulated in response to a colonial narrative, in 
which culture was the distinguishing factor of what is good and valuable, in opposition 
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to the ‘natural’ or the ‘native’. Forster was highly critical of the “beneficent machine” of 
King and country (2006, 153) and, according to Quentin Bailey, showed a deep concern 
with formal education as expediter of moral agency (2002, 329). It is important, 
however, not to flatten the complexities of this discussion in favour of the hoary 
nature/culture divide. This paper does not, therefore, position the environment as a place 
of atonement against the shortcomings of the university. It argues instead that Forster 
not only stakes a liberal and humanistic view of education – what Lionel Trilling (1965) 
labelled Forster’s “liberal imagination” – against the repressive conformity and 
authoritarianism of formal education, but that he can be read as offering a 
phenomenological response to this issue of ethical development directly through living 
the natural environment. After exploring further the idea of immanence and 
entanglement, this paper will apply these concepts first in The Longest Journey and then 
in Maurice. Their different realisations highlight Forster’s phenomenological stance. 
 
This analysis backs Forster’s most famous epigrammatic interjection ‘only 
connect’, which belies a simple anthropomorphic humanism, and instead delineates a 
relationship between humanity and the environment that hinges on the intersubjectivity, 
or immanence, of existence within the world. Immanence relates to all possible 
becomings, and the entanglement of nature and culture is the performance of one such 
becoming based on the open-ended naturecultural practices that create the world-body 
space (Barad 2007, 172), for example, in the gaze. In so doing, it encourages an 
appreciation of Forster’s embodied sense of place that has been showcased in many of 
his early stories, albeit in a more conventional and paternalistic sense, as nostalgia for a 
green retreat. Elizabeth Ellem posits that the ‘greenwood’ denotes Forster’s ideal of a 
refuge from cultural and intellectual life (1976, 89). Wilfred Stone considers this 
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environmental engagement to be mainly aesthetic (1996, 184). Kelly Sultzbach, 
however, suggests that Forster drew on the pastoral tradition of conservation against the 
threat of urbanisation, but that he later engaged in more complex manner with the 
environment (2016, 39). Forster’s shift in environmental ethics, however, – one in 
which being-in-the-world is pitched against nostalgic pastoralism – is not a later 
historical development, but, as will be discussed, already part of his consideration of the 
natural world in The Longest Journey (1907). 
This consideration suggests a phenomenological response to the world – a 
growth of mind that develops not as a sense-making instrument of the other, but as 
entangled with the environment. Forster’s address of Cambridge can thus be understood 
in the context of his growing interest in “consciousness immanent in the universe” 
(Langland 2007, 101), and his appreciation of nature as ‘annex of the school’ (Forster 
1951, 369). Forster’s characteristic ‘double vision’ – what Wilfred Stone calls his 
“symbiotic dualisms” (1966, 43) – works here not on the basis of the dichotomy 
between culture and nature, but on the basis of an intra-action between self and 
environment that is reflected in the dynamism of doing and being (Barad 2007, 170). 
Forster’s view on eudaimonia is, therefore, considered here through its 
insistence on lived experience for the development of moral character. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty states in Phenomenology of Perception (1962) that formal education 
belongs to the “cultural apparatus” that forms habits of consciousness, but that it is the 
lived experience of the body that mediates the world (61). He declares: “there is no 
inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself” (xi). This 
phenomenological approach to learning is, therefore, diametrically opposed to the 
reductionist position of the corps d’esprit, the adoption of the individual into the system 
so disdained by Forster.  
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Importantly, however, a phenomenological stance, and particularly Merleau-
Ponty’s emphasis on the body, highlights the tensions between a reproductive ‘formal’ 
education, and a creative ‘liberal’ education that foregrounds self-individualisation and 
self-development of the mind. In Kiymet Selvi’s words, a phenomenological approach 
to education equals transformation (2008, 46), but such practices must be lived in 
relation to nature. Only then does transformation combat the disciplined, emotional 
economy of gratuitous self-denial that is enhanced by cultured responses to nature. The 
transformative power of the university remains ineffective when contrasted with being-
in-the-world. The nexus of immanence as timeless being, and transcendence as a use of 
reason to make meaning of the world, dissolves in the direct experience of environment 
– the constant becoming that is underwritten by the inherent dynamism of existence. 
In simple terms, Cambridge cloaks lived experience through its liberal heritage 
and classicising form of humanist education, whereas phenomenological approaches to 
knowledge hinge on knowing in direct (intra-)action with the environment. As 
phenomenology, the university is “an artificial world answering to the total intention of 
[one’s] being” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 341). This, in Merleau-Ponty’s framing of 
phenomenology, is not lived experience but merely a hallucination of the world.  
The “Cambridge of G. E. Moore […] that sought for reality and cared for truth” 
(Forster 2006, xxiii), is, therefore, a problematic ideal. This is evident in the way the 
protagonists in The Longest Journey and Maurice, Rickie Elliot and Maurice Hall, forge 
a similar yet divergent path through Cambridge and into the world. Whilst it is 
legitimate to flag up the essential differences between Rickie and Maurice in terms of 
disposition and background – for example, Rickie’s hereditary physical blemish in 
contrast to Maurice’s organic vigour – the important difference between the two 
characters lies in their phenomenological entanglement with the environment.  
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Rickie’s cultivation at Cambridge is portrayed largely as rejecting the materiality 
of his body, an endeavour that results in his deterioration and death. His understanding 
of the world is determined by boundaries, which stand in the way of lived experience. 
Such failures also trouble Maurice at first. However, contrary to Ricky, Maurice’s 
growing embodied awareness is part of, not separate from, the material world. His 
increasing performance of his being-in-nature, for example, when he questions whether 
he belongs to the “life of the earth” (1977, 188), results in what Michael Bonnett (2009) 
has termed ‘phenomenological self-hood’ and enables him to subsume boundaries. In 
sum, eudaimonia is responsive to a phenomenological, embodied entanglement of the 
world that collapses the human/nature divide, as is the case in Maurice. Failures in lived 
experience are due to the separation of the human from nature, as will become evident 
in The Longest Journey. 
The Longest Journey follows Rickie Elliot, who cherishes his Cambridge 
experience and his friendship with philosopher Stewart Ansell. He abandons his writerly 
aspirations to his doomed marriage to Agnes Pembroke. He also learns he has an 
illegitimate half-brother, Stephen Wonham, and these associations serves as the crucible 
in which Rickie’s relationship with the environment is forged. Due to the 
autobiographical topos of “escape” to university, it appears reasonable to look on The 
Longest Journey as an exaltation of academic life informed by Forster’s own 
experiences at King’s College. But, to adopt David Craig’s phrase, Forster’s perceived 
“idolization of Cambridge [...] gives rise to unrealities” (1973, 470). The treatment of 
phenomenology in The Longest Journey hinges instead on the way Rickie Elliot draws 
boundaries between Cambridge and what he calls the world. Throughout the novel, 
Forster indicates how Rickie’s ontological and epistemological stance precludes direct 
knowledge of his environment. Looking at the elm trees outside his college room 
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window, he can only perceive them as “Dryads – so Rickie believed or pretended” 
(Forster 2006, 4). Rickie’s almost continuous state of epistemological bewilderment will 
scarcely improve throughout the novel. His self-criticism of “all the confidence and 
mutual knowledge that is born in such a place as Cambridge” (Forster 2006, 64) shows 
how he has some self-knowledge, but his refusal to become materially involved in his 
environment, and instead remember nature as symbol, paves the way for his 
deterioration. 
Forster depicts Rickie as someone who lacks the aptitude to heal the rift between 
him and the environment through lived experience. Rather than taste the “teacup of 
experience” to reach the moment when he can claim “I will create. I will be an 
experience” (Forster 2006, 61), Rickie looks at experience as a distorted romantic vision 
of the “splendours and horrors of the world” (Forster 2006, 59). The distortion, 
however, means that the heart of things remains hidden to him. As Merleau-Ponty 
states, perception “must at the present moment so organise itself as to present a picture 
to me in which I can recognise my former experiences” (1962, 19), but Rickie’s 
perception is physically and mentally closed off, because he uses Cambridge as the door 
to shut himself off from the environment. Rickie’s story, therefore, is one of separation, 
rather than integration. 
Ansell reminds him that this is a separation “which does not exist and never has 
existed” (Forster 2006, 63). In this instance, Rickie’s unidentified physical disability 
may, in fact, contribute to his unsuccessful performance of the world. Chiasmic 
ontology, as proposed by Merleau-Ponty, envisions an intertwining between flesh and 
the world. As Louise Westling notes, the body “is a nexus in a web of significations 
woven throughout a world full of immanent meaning” (2014, 118). Rickie’s faulty 
flesh, its singular otology, acts as a shield from reciprocal interactions with the world.  
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This may be why his link to the environment is pure(ly) vicarious, even when he 
dwells amidst it. Instead, Rickie reads Romantic poets for their perceived transcendent 
powers of nature description. The “Romantic inward turn” as Paltin sees it, favours a 
life of mind in which the external world is eventually abandoned to inward anxieties 
(2013, 790). Hence, Rickie succumbs to the ‘pathetic fallacy’ and overlays his own 
physical anxieties onto an anthropocentric landscape. His dell near Madingley is, for 
example, “paved with grass” (Forster 2006, 18, my italics) and within it he found his 
‘Church’. When he visits he leans against a tree, engrossed in Keats “he thought he had 
been reading” (Forster 2006, 19), illuminating the lack of connection between him and 
the tree, but also between him and Keats. His anxieties are metonymically 
circumscribed by the man-made dell, whose “green bank at the entrance hid the road 
and the world” (Forster 2006, 27). Rickie falls short of nature that, in Paltin’s words, 
cannot be represented but must be experienced (2013, 792). 
This separation from the world, first championed by Rickie at Cambridge, is 
further challenged by the open countryside at Cadover in Wiltshire, which is portrayed 
as the ‘life pastoral’ (Forster 2006, 85). Owned by Rickie’s aunt, the estate and its 
surrounding countryside adumbrates Rickie’s material failure. On his forced ride with 
Stephen Wonham, who lives on the estate, Rickie progresses through Wiltshire in a 
half-trance and finally falls asleep (Forster 2006, 108 – 9). This inaction towards the 
infinite space of the countryside separates him from lived experience. He is denied the 
productive practices of entanglement and instead swerves apart not only from his fellow 
human beings, but also from his environment. In fact, whilst he considers himself to be 
skilled “in the principles of human existence, […] he was not so indecently familiar 
with examples” (Forster 2006, 111).  
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A similar entrenchment occurs at the Cadbury Rings, which also arbitrates for 
separation. The hill fort, presented as a symbolic imprinting of human history on 
passive landscape, becomes a direct critique of Rickie’s inaction. Initially it challenges 
his attention as it arranges the “whole system of the country” before him (Forster 2006, 
126). Then, as he did in the dell at Madingley, Rickie draws out a book – this time he 
reads Shelley – which rejects this intra-activity of hill fort, history and self. Similar to 
the dell, the earthen rings eventually configure boundaries that diminish the view of the 
world, because Rickie conceives of them as ‘ramparts’. As Rickie penetrates to the 
interior, the familiar world disappears, and a possible entanglement, a social-material 
enactment, is set in motion. Apocryphal vanishing narratives, in which the earth 
swallows the intruder and strips away all culture, highlight the agency of matter in 
theories of entanglement. In this instance, the tree in the middle of the inner ring 
revolves before his eyes, and Rickie faints, then awakens, level with the “structure of 
the clods” (Forster 2006, 130). He is, however, quickly whisked away from tactile earth 
and rustling turnip leaves, victim to the human intrigue to which the countryside is now 
considered an accomplice. This moment of a possible gliding beneath, a moment of 
entangled, lived experience, is rejected and Rickie spends the rest of the year confined 
to bed with a “curious breakdown” (Forster 2006, 140).  
The tree at the centre of Cadover Rings is a phenomenon, a dynamic topological 
reconfiguration of sedimented histories of intra-actions (Barad 2007, 141, 151). Rickie’s 
relationship with trees is, however, symbolic, not material. His many encounters with 
trees that reveal themselves as nothing but ‘trees’ are, therefore, stepping stones towards 
his degradation. On the train to Cadover, Rickie looks out of the train window but sees 
nothing but a “tumbling wilderness of brown” (Forster 2006, 271). He is not able to 
discern nature as immanent, as he is blind to the horizon of unseen things. The horizon, 
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as Merleau-Ponty suggests, is not only the distance at which pure being exists, but 
simultaneously integrates the ‘thickness’ of experience at close range (1968, 84). 
Instead of integrating the thickness of these native verlands in his life perspective, 
Rickie only sees them as ‘other’ to the “gray fluxions” of the city (Forster 2006, 270). In 
the climactic scene in which he comes upon his drunken brother Stephen, Rickie cries 
out, “not yet remembering himself” and he “stood by the elm tree, clutching the ridges 
of its bark” (Forster 2006, 281). The clutching of the tree connotes the conflict between 
skin and bark, a failed chiasm that lacks immanence. Rickie rejects the encroachment of 
the world onto his flesh and denies the act of transgression that Merleau-Ponty 
considers central to this chiasmic reversibility of meaning (1968, 248 – 9). Even though 
trees represent “perhaps the most glorious invitation to the brainless life that has ever 
been given” (Forster 2006, 47), Rickie’s blind seizing of the elm occasions his final 
condemnation. Rickie dies in a state of disillusionment and despair, separate from the 
natural life force that is unending.  
Merleau-Ponty states that “the essence of death is always on the horizon of my 
thinking” (1962, 364), recognising the idea of death and decay as another form of life. 
He talks about life as ‘atmosphere’ that shrouds the horizon, and death may erroneously 
be thought of as breaking the inextricable involvement of the body in life. The pure 
being of the horizon, however, is not negated by a perceived ‘non-being’ after death 
(1968, 84). This ‘hyper-empirical’ immanence of all possible becomings is, 
nevertheless, out of Rickie’s reach, as he has clearly not learned the ‘lesson of 
incompleteness,’ even in his last moments (Forster 2006, 327). Experience, ideally, has 
no definitive limits. It is continuity within the stream of life. Entanglement, as Barad 
notes, is continuously ongoing (2007, 180). Yet in his last moments before his death, 
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the stream, a place of symbolic relevance where Rickie had watched “the black earth 
unite to the black sky” at the horizon (Forster 2006, 272), means nothing now. 
David Sidorsky notes that a superior private moral code must always work in 
commitment to reality (2007, 248), but Rickie never commits himself fully to the 
materiality of the world. His sense of relation of his self to his environment is thus not a 
virtuous one, even though he claims that the reason for existence is to “do good! […] 
make people happier and better” (Forster 2006, 152). In fact, he seems to personify his 
own rebuke to a schoolboy that “[y]ou can’t be good until you’ve had a little happiness” 
(Forster 2006, 187). Happiness, a eudaimonic oneness with the world, is outside his 
reach, because he rejects the materiality of being, as he wearily, half-heartedly heaves 
his failing body out of the train’s way (Forster 2006, 282). 
 
While Rickie’s failure is an indictment of maturation in a moral vacuum behind 
man-made ramparts against ‘the world’, Maurice Hall finds himself deeply entangled in 
nature almost from the start. Maurice is the story of a young man’s growing 
understanding of his own sexuality. He attends Cambridge, where is deep friendship 
with Clive Durham accompanies an inner struggle for harmony. After recognising that 
Clive has conformed to society’s pressures, Maurice himself finally accepts his being 
and vanishes into the ‘greenwood’.  
The Cambridge chapters in Maurice have, so far, yielded contradictory 
interpretations as to their value. Glen Cavaliero was one of the first to note that 
Cambridge represents the “innocent idealism of the adolescent”, conflicting with the 
epistemological challenges with which Rickie has to contend (1979, 136). Matthew 
Curr’s perception of Forster’s “ethical pedagogy” in Maurice, which develops through 
the themes of beauty and love, nevertheless skirts the issue of formal education and 
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lived experience (2001, 63). Also, as noted by Howard Booth, the bildung of Maurice is 
actually inverted (2007, 183). Forster shows how Maurice effortlessly steps “into the 
niche that England had prepared for him” (Forster 1977, 53) and how suited he already 
is to the bourgeois life. Yet, Maurice’s conventional life thread begins to unravel when 
he starts to question his separation from experience. Whilst he at one point comes 
dangerously close to Rickie’s fate of ‘not-remembering’ himself in the hypnotist’s chair, 
he manages to reassert himself, not in opposition to, but in unison with nature.  
Maurice is aware early on in his schooling that formal education does not tally 
with his experiences. The defiant tone at the end of the beach section (Forster 1977, 20), 
in which the horrors of ‘the facts of life’ are hurriedly scratched into the sand, but as 
swiftly erased by the tide, conveys a preliminary sense of misappropriation of the 
environment, in which culturally defined shame overrules the inherent oneness of 
human nature and the natural environment. Forster’s phrase “We can only interpret by 
our experiences” becomes a leitmotif for Maurice’s further development (Forster 1977, 
113). Unlike Rickie, whose mental development is arrested, and whose moral 
“equilibrium” is never seriously disturbed, Maurice’s advancement happens despite or, 
perhaps, because of his initiation as a “mediocre member of a mediocre school” (Forster 
1977, 25). Maurice’s entanglement ultimately leads to new realisations and acceptance 
by means of what J. H. Stape calls “reconciling the absolute with the actual and 
contingent” (1990, 144). Maurice, therefore, ultimately flourishes whilst Rickie 
deteriorates, because he recognises himself immanent with the environment. 
Forster opens Maurice with the statement that “(t)here is much to be said for 
apathy in education” (Forster 1977, 15), signalling his inherent pedagogical stance as 
one of ongoing self-realisation. He uses ‘muddle’, a synonym for ‘getting into a tangle’, 
which is conventionally seen as a negative, opposed to the unclouded clearness of mind 
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advocated by Hellenistic Cambridge. Both Ricky and Maurice are implicated in this 
muddle, but Forster plots divergent routes for Maurice’s ‘torpid brain’ to Rickie’s 
continual bewilderment. The theme of ‘muddle’, ‘trance’ and darkness informs all early 
references to Maurice’s thinking, in which he, similarly to Rickie, displays the typical 
obtuse public-school mentality deplored by Forster. References to clouded vision and 
muted sounds depict Maurice’s character as if in stagnation. It is, however, a darkness 
and a silence in which lies the potential for immanence, as it portents the nothingness at 
the bottom of a unified existence, the invisibility within the visible (Merleau-Ponty 
1968, 142). On finishing his public school, a “check, a silence, fell upon the complex 
process” (Forster 1977, 27) of education. On entering Cambridge, Maurice “stood still 
in the darkness instead of groping about” (Forster 1977, 31). Maurice thus avoids 
reference to the dichotomies of a clear ‘other’ and promotes a hybridity, in which the 
mind is able to expand beyond defined boundaries into a deterritorialised environment.  
In contrast to Rickie, whose bewilderment never lifts, Maurice’s mental 
performances become increasingly ethical. For example, in his second year he 
understands “by no process of reason” that his classmates were “human beings with 
feelings akin to his own” (Forster 1977, 32). This development is a direct reference to 
phenomenology as mental growth, a process of clarification that eventually allows 
Maurice to cast judgement. Whilst it would be premature to assign to Maurice mental 
precocity, his query – “Was this the world?” (Forster 1977, 29) – resonates effectively 
as an ontological quandary throughout the novel, and contrasts with Rickie’s futile 
notion of the ‘great world’ outside the gates of Cambridge.  
The question posited by the narrator at the beginning of Maurice’s university 
career – “What hope for Maurice who was nothing but falsities?” (Forster 1977, 39) – 
is, therefore, not rhetorical. As the plot develops, it becomes clear that there is, indeed, 
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great hope for him. Bret Keeling (2003) makes a valid point, when he suggests identity 
in Maurice does not require articulation, only realisation. These realisations are the 
causal and non-arbitrary intra-actions of material agencies. His nightly vigils in the 
college quad, for example, are intra-actions of attempts at self-knowledge, trees and 
rain. 
It has been widely argued that Cambridge is a “place of youthful romance” 
(Rahman 1998, 433), and, as Henry Alley suggests, facilitates “the flesh educating the 
spirit” (2010, 212). (Sexual) nature is interpreted as opposite to culture, and Claude 
Summers considers nature, in the form of the greenwood, humanistically as providing 
healing and wholeness (1985, 110). The greenwood is understood as an escape from 
social sanctions at a time when homosexuality was a serious criminal offence. The 
‘queering’ of normative discourses on what is natural is, therefore, an important 
contribution. Forster, as Sultzbach indicates, creates a queer pastoral retreat for 
Maurice, in which the natural impulse of homosexuality is depicted as wild and free 
(2016, 53). But this perspective limits the impact of Maurice’s entanglement with 
nature, which extend far beyond the ‘greenwood’. His entanglement serves his mental 
and moral development, as well as his sexual being. It is a holistic development, a 
waxing and waning of capacity in relation to the environment. Every period of growth 
represents a step further towards the point of clarification, the embodied knowledge of 
the environment. 
His real growth peaks, therefore, at Clive Durham’s country house, Penge. 
Despite Ellem’s contention that references to nature are few in Maurice (1976, 95), 
there are persuasive stages in Maurice’s surrender of his separate being that are directly 
linked to its natural environment. Penge is, like Cadover, embedded in the historical 
landscape of southwest England. Unlike Rickie’s detachment to Wiltshire, Maurice’s 
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engagement with Penge unravels the fabric of his cultural being, and he becomes more 
and more attuned to an environment which, although man-made and man-aged, shows 
signs of neglected husbandry and dilapidation, a semiotic pointer to nature’s 
unconscious existence and agentive potential. In its disordered and inassimilable way 
the environment has become estranged and playful (Paltin 2013, 786). Maurice’s initial 
irritation with the perceived ‘incompetence’ of nature ceases when Alec’s face appears 
amongst the dog roses (Forster 1977, 156). This encounter signals the immanent erasure 
of boundaries and initiates a new ‘rearrangement of being’ in terms of lived, embodied 
experience.  
The relation (rather than discrimination) of Penge to Cambridge is evident in the 
“[g]hostly but perfect” primroses (Forster 1977, 161), which Maurice first encountered 
in Risley’s room, and which represent a tangle that foreshadows Maurice’s embodied 
oneness with nature. Maurice ventures outside to “listen to the dripping trees” (Forster 
1977, 161) at Penge, something he had frequently done at Cambridge. The ubiquitous 
primrose pollen daubs his hair, the scents of the apricots – “the tangle of flowers and 
fruits wreathed his brain” (Forster 1977, 166) – are all instances of the ongoing 
topological dynamics of enfolding “spacetimematter” (Barad 2007, 177). Maurice is 
entangled with a thriving ecosystem of lopsided flowers that “swarm with caterpillars 
and bulged with galls” (Forster 1977, 156), a materiality beyond a spiritual green place.  
The vital connection to nature’s enigmatic powers is more than a foil to a merely 
humanist ‘othering’ of nature as the opposite of culture – either to be managed or to be 
worshipped. Instead, the bodily intertwining of human and environment is expressed in 
the ecophenomenological perspective of Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm (1968, 142), or, as 
Sultzbach conceives it, the reflexive sensory (2016, 68). In chiasm, Maurice’s mental 
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realisation is preceded by the bodily impression of entangled matter of flowers, fruit and 
brain.  
Merleau-Ponty privileges nature’s power to vanquish all claims to a unique 
human conscious agency and interrogates how “things form and undo themselves in a 
gliding beneath the yes and the no” (1968, 102). This defiance of binaries embeds ethics 
in a framework of uncertainty. Rickie was unable to glide, and instead opted firmly for 
the ‘no’. However, Maurice’s several ‘rearrangements’ of being within the narrative 
each contribute to his ‘gliding beneath’ the certainties of fixed values of selfhood. He 
begins to know himself as being-in-the-world. This does not mean that difference is 
eradicated, but that knowledge requires fluidity and uncertainty. It signals an 
immanence that does not resolve the straining oppositions in his being, but instead 
opens up possibilities of biophilic being that embraces the many agencies of nature.  
Initially desperate to erase the memory of his sexual nature in the hypnotist’s 
chair, Maurice is now open to the ether. This non-deterministic attention may be 
considered evidence of ‘unbecoming’ rather than becoming (Matz 2002, 317). In the 
end, therefore, Maurice dissolves into an eternal present, because “[h]is whole life he 
had known things but not known them” (Forster 1977, 180). This timelessness and 
unconsciousness is, in fact, a phenomenological process, as he is entering a unity of 
spacetime that erases and enfolds at the same time. His final acceptance of his 
immanence is intimately connected with the natural environment, but not just in the 
form of the ‘greenwood’, as critical convention dictates. The “forests and the night were 
on his side”, but Maurice is now able to dispute with his old self whether the “life of the 
earth” is separate to or immanent in his life (Forster 1977, 187) and the primroses and 
the dog roses that are entangled with him. 
19 
 
The key dichotomy between Cambridge and Penge (or Cadover) is not that one 
is a symbol of cultural expectation and the other a sign of sexual nature, but that one 
could be conceived as prioritising separation from lived experience, and the other as 
encouraging surrender to it. Maurice, however, understands the reciprocal parallels 
between the two places, linked, as they are, explicitly through cultivated flowers 
(Forster 1977, 180).  
At their last interview, Clive leads Maurice outside into the “deserted alley 
behind the laurels, where evening primroses gleamed” (Forster 1977, 211), unaware that 
this will precipitate Maurice’s unbecoming. In the darkness Clive can only discern him, 
like some astronomer deduces the transit of a planet in front of a distant sun, by the 
disappearance and appearance of the luminous primrose blossoms in his observational 
field. Maurice’s hair, previously yellow with pollen, now signals its affinity with stars, 
and the flowers “embossed with faint yellow the walls of the night” (Forster 1977, 211). 
Natureculture is here evidenced by the inseparability of Maurice from his environment. 
Clive’s sole application of cultural norms only provides an imperfect understanding. His 
abstracted and indirect knowledge of Maurice “amid darkness and perishing flowers” 
challenges Clive’s final epiphany (Forster 1977, 213). All that is left of Maurice after 
their conversation is a pile of primrose petals, and Clive is not sure whether Maurice is 
not, after all, still there, “beckoning him, clothed in the sun” (Forster 1977, 215). His 
flow of perception is contrived by imperfect recollection of the star-like quality of the 
primrose pollen. The spectral impression of Maurice exists only in relation to what 
Clive had already gathered in his consciousness. But even Clive recognises Maurice’s 
affinity with stars, sound and scent. 
Lois Cucullu proposes how Cambridge, “intellectual, secular and insular”, is 
represented in The Longest Journey by Rickie (1998, 35). In Maurice it is Clive, as 
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Forster states in his Terminal Note, who “is Cambridge […] The calm, the superiority of 
outlook, the clarity and the intelligence, the assured moral standards” (Forster 1977, 
218). More truthfully, however, it is Maurice’s immanence with both Cambridge and 
nature that takes an ethical stance. Forster suggests that the key themes of integration 
and immanence are not equally effective in the two novels. They prove, in fact, to be 
deadly to a subject that insist on its separation.  
 
No critic has so far speculated on Forster’s oft-mentioned set of ‘triadic’ 
leitmotifs in these two novels, which are shown here to underpin the development of 
character as a process of mental clarification, lived experience and finally immanence in 
nature (Christie 2005, 30). Forster proposes in Maurice an alternative discourse between 
self and ‘the world’, which is conducted by embracing the intra-actions of being-in-the-
world. This reading of The Longest Journey and Maurice has argued a productive 
material perspective, in which the dynamism of being-in-nature offset simplistic notions 
of nature as a spatial configuration, e.g. the greenwood as escape. 
Forster’s sense of nature has been considered mainly within a framework of the 
‘neohellenist pastoral’, especially his short stories that act through covert romanticism, 
such as ‘The Story of a Panic’, or political interpretations of countryside, as, for 
example in Howard’s End or A Passage to India (Sultzbach 2016). These writings are 
interpreted as reflecting an unease at the beginning of the twentieth century, in which 
landscape was threatened by modernisation, alienation and reproduction. I would argue 
that Forster’s commitment in The Longest Journey and Maurice to nature as rooted in 
lived experience adds a phenomenological angle to his engagement with landscape. The 
material turn in thinking that underpins Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, is also 
evident in Forster’s ontology, in which characters like Maurice encounter an active 
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world, and not just the cultural imprint of it, to which they surrender their being. This 
paper utilises what Bailey has termed the “discursive intersection between literature and 
education” (2002, 325) to suggest that the protagonist of Maurice thrives because of his 
phenomenological self-knowledge, whilst the one in The Longest Journey dies because 
of his failure. 
In both The Longest Journey and Maurice, Forster develops a vision of life that 
involves attention to the natural environment, an entangled ‘seeing the world as it is’, as 
a first moral step. As Iris Murdoch notes, this seeing frees the self from prejudice 
against the materiality of the world (2007, 82, 89). This position informs also Forster’s 
implicit aim of moral education. As one frees oneself from prejudice and attends to the 
world without blinkers, one also frees oneself from the imposed character that Forster 
deplores as a product of formal character education. The act of seeing nature is central 
to this process, as it promotes attention – the way to penetrate to the root of things, not 
solely by transcending experience, but by immanence. Instead of focusing on ‘shapeless 
lumps of experience’ (James 2009, 105), which are selectively presented through the 
self-interested lens of a character like Rickie, Forster shows how Maurice’s gaze is at 
once undirected, yet attentive, allowing nature to resonate deeply within his being. 
Seeing becomes a performance of the world. 
By attending to the phenomenological lens through which the two novels are 
examined, Forster’s well-known charge against the corps d’esprit, led by his insistence 
on immanence in nature, gains complexity. One can go a step further and suggest that at 
a moral level, Maurice finds himself “involved in a world in which [he] inhere[s]” 
(James 2009, 21), whereas Rickie chafes against the world with his self-conscious will. 
The issue at hand is that phenomenological foundations of existence bring humankind 
closer to a breaking down of reified barriers upheld by cultural institutions. The 
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misleading world of appearance that finishes off Rickie, dissolves in Maurice’s seeing 
of nature, and triggers his own immanence within the world. In Rickie’s case, the 
symbol of the tree-nymph highlights the separation of nature and body that cannot cross 
over the skin/bark chiasm. The ‘spirit of the body’ remains reified and separated, it does 
not ‘connect’. 
Culture is transcribed within nature to form the often-ridiculed notion of 
natureculture (Reinertsen 2016). Yet this concept, nevertheless, allows for a 
recalibration of our attention to hybrid relationships that inform our moral senses. 
Forster’s two novels affirm a complex affiliation of identity, landscape and ethics that 
will eventually become, in the shape of the Marabar caves, utterly unknowing. In the 
unknowing of our being-in-nature lies our deepest relationships with the world, to 
which we can only attend with a mind entangled in the materiality of our planet. 
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